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1. Introduction 
Figure 1 shows  the  basics  of a theory  of recessions.  Labor supply  and 
labor demand  are nearly  flat.  A  small  downward  movement  of either 
schedule  generates  a  recession  with  a  substantial  decline  in  employ- 
ment.  Is the story of Figure 1 plausible  in the light of all of the evidence 
about the labor market in recession?  In particular, is Figure 1 consistent 
with  the  fact  that  recessions  bring  a large  increase  in  the  number  of 
people  interested  in  working,  looking  for work,  but  not  at work? My 
purpose  in this paper is to investigate  the factual support for an interpre- 
tation  of a recession  as a leftward  shift  in the  intersection  of flat labor 
supply  and labor demand. 
It will  avoid  confusion  to  state  my  definitions  of labor demand  and 
labor supply  at the  outset.  The labor demand  schedule  is the locus  of 
employment-real  wage  points  traced out by economic  changes  that shift 
labor supply  but  not  labor demand.  These  could  originate  in  shifts  in 
preferences,  changes  in wealth,  or changes  in the real interest rate. The 
basic  determinants  of  the  slope  of  labor demand  are the  diminishing 
marginal product  of labor, changes  in the elasticity  of product  demand 
as  output  varies,  and  complementarities  across  firms  and  industries. 
Similarly, the  labor  supply  schedule  is  the  locus  of  employment-real 
wage  combinations  traced out by economic  changes  that shift labor de- 
mand but not labor supply.  These could originate in shifts in technology 
or changes  in the elasticity of product demand.  The basic determinant of 
the slope of labor supply  is the diminishing  marginal value of time spent 
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in activities  other than work.  In the usual development  of labor supply, 
the alternative activity is time spent at home  in leisure activities, but this 
paper will focus on job search as the alternative activity. I should  note as 
well that in the presence  of wage  rigidity, the definition  of labor supply  I 
have adopted  would  result in a perfectly elastic, horizontal labor supply 
schedule. 
Much of this paper is about the flatness  of labor demand.  The princi- 
ple  of  diminishing  returns  teaches  us  that the  schedule  slopes  down- 
ward.  But the  extent  of diminishing  returns is an empirical issue  even 
under  standard  assumptions  about the technology.  Under nonstandard 
conditions-complementarities  or increasing returns-the  labor demand 
schedule  is more likely to be flat, and can even  slope upward in the case 
of complementarities. 
With respect to the evidence  on the slope of labor demand,  I start with 
empirical  work  on  the  relation  between  employment  and  the  product 
wage.  I derive  an  estimating  equation  suited  to  conditions  of  market 
power  and  increasing  returns;  it is  a generalization  of a standard  ap- 
proach  to  estimating  the  elasticity  of  substitution.  The  labor demand 
schedule  of a particular industry  is traced out as shifts that occur in the 
product demand  and labor supply  to that industry. Estimation with two- 
digit data for the United States shows  that the labor demand  schedule  is 
quite flat-there  is little variation in product  wages  as employment  re- 
sponds  to  shifts  in  labor  supply.  I go  on  to  cite  other  evidence  that 
supports  the  flatness  of  labor  demand.  In particular, the  behavior  of 
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inventories  is inconsistent  with diminishing  marginal product of labor- 
firms do not generally  take advantage  of periods  of low output  to build 
up stocks of inventories. 
On the labor supply  side,  unemployment  has an important role in the 
view  developed  in this paper. Two bodies  of research on unemployment 
have  been  influential  in  the  evolution  of  this  view.  First,  Davis  and 
Haltiwanger  (1990) have shown  that the employment  declines  that occur 
in recessions  are concentrated  among  a small number  of firms making 
large cutbacks.  For the majority of firms, employment  growth  occurs at 
normal  rates.  To put  it  differently,  the  cross-sectional  distribution  of 
employment  growth  across firms looks  much  the same in recessions  as 
in normal years,  except that its lower tail, measuring  large employment 
declines,  is much  larger in recessions.  Davis  and Haltiwanger's  results 
suggest  that recessions  are times  when  there is a large increase  in the 
number  of  job-seekers  who  have  been  released  into  the  labor market 
because  of major upheavals  at their previous  employers. 
The second  important  body  of research is Blanchard and Diamond's 
(1990) investigation  of flows  in  the  labor market.  Their central finding 
for  the  issues  in  this  paper  is  that  job-finding  rates  for unemployed 
workers  are  only  slightly  lower  in  recessions  than  in  normal  times. 
Essentially  all of  the  increase  in  unemployment  during  a recession  is 
the result of a greater flow of workers out of jobs; very little comes from 
increasing  duration  of job search.  Although  these  findings  need  further 
validation  with  respect  to their sensitivity  to aggregation  and measure- 
ment  problems,  they  do  seem  to  point  in  the  following  direction:  In 
recession,  the  labor  market  carries  out  a  much  increased  volume  of 
worker-job  matching,  without  suffering  a decline  in  the  efficiency  in 
the process.  Congestion  in the matching  process  is apparently offset by 
agglomeration  efficiencies. 
The  general  view  I advance  in this  paper,  in  support  of the  supply- 
and-demand  analysis  of Figure 1, is that the economy  faces a choice at 
the  margin  between  producing  goods  and  reorganizing.  The  demand 
curve in Figure 1 is the marginal product of labor and the supply  curve is 
the marginal product of job matching  and other reorganizational uses  of 
time.  Neither  activity  has  significant  diminishing  marginal  product  of 
labor. Hence  small  perturbations  in  either  schedule  bring large move- 
ments  in the allocation  of labor between  the two activities.  This view  is 
related  to  the  idea  proposed  by  Cooper  and  Haltiwanger  (1990) that 
times of lower productivity  are the best times to replace the capital stock. 
I take  a more  general  view  about  the  source  of  the  perturbation  and 
about the nature of the alternative activity to production  of goods. 
A comparison  with  the real business  cycle (RBC) model  seems  appro- 20 *  HALL 
priate at this  point.  The  model  in  this  paper  shares  the  RBC model's 
perspective  that employment  fluctuations  are results of shifts of an eco- 
nomic equilibrium,  not departures from equilibrium. Neither model sug- 
gests  that there are unexploited  gains from trade during recessions.  The 
first key difference  between  the two models  is in the alternative activity 
whose  value  determines  the supply  curve of labor to goods  production. 
In the RBC model,  the alternative  activity is leisure  (Kydland and Pres- 
cott,  1982; Prescott,  1986; Rogerson,  1988) or work at home  (Benhabib, 
Rogerson,  and  Wright,  1991). Here,  the alternative  activity is job seek- 
ing,  either  active  (visiting  employers,  responding  to help-wanted  ads, 
and  the  like),  or passive  (waiting  for a job to open  up).  In my  model, 
there  is  no  substitution  at  all between  time  spent  at  home  and  time 
devoted  to work or job seeking. 
The second  critical difference between  the model of this paper and the 
RBC model  is  in  the  driving  force  of employment  fluctuations.  In the 
RBC model,  the labor demand  schedule  is the marginal product of labor 
from  a neoclassical  production  function  (generally  Cobb-Douglas).  In 
that framework,  only  shifts  of labor demand  generate  realistic employ- 
ment fluctuations.  Other perturbations,  such as changes  in government 
purchases  (Barro, 1980) or in  the  timing  of  consumption  (Baxter and 
King,  1990) cause  countercyclical  movements  in  the  real wage  as  the 
level  of  employment  moves  up  and  down  a relatively  steep  labor de- 
mand schedule.  But the real wage  is not countercyclical.  Hence the RBC 
view  is inextricably committed  to vibrations of technology  as the driving 
force of employment  fluctuations.  The notion that recessions  are times of 
technical  regress  has  not  appealed  to most  practical economists  (Sum- 
mers,  1986). By contrast,  the view  advanced  in this paper is that labor 
demand  is flatter than suggested  by a neoclassical production function.  I 
present  direct  evidence  on  the  slope  of  labor  demand.  I also  review 
evidence  from the behavior  of inventories  and  from productivity  mea- 
sures that provide  indirect support for the flat labor demand hypothesis. 
A comparison  with views  of employment  volatility based on price and 
wage  rigidity is also in order. First, a simple  model  portrays the level of 
employment  as being  at the  intersection  of a downward-sloping  labor 
demand  schedule  and  a prescribed  rigid real wage.  Though  I am not 
aware of any recent attempts  to apply this setup to the issue  of employ- 
ment fluctuations,  precisely  this model  was  used  extensively  to explain 
persistent  high unemployment  in Europe in the early 1980s. The flat line 
depicting  the rigid real wage  becomes  the labor supply  schedule  in Fig- 
ure 1. Absent  a theory of the flat line based on rational economic  behav- 
ior, the real wage  rigidity model  has not achieved  much acceptance.  As 
Barro (1977) pointed  out,  the central issue  is not whether  compensation Labor  Demand,  Supply,  and  Employment  Volatility  *  21 
is rigid-it  is whether  rational economic  actors would  absorb the dead- 
weight  losses  associated  with  the  employment  fluctuations  that  a flat 
labor supply  schedule  causes,  if the  schedule  does  not properly  reflect 
the marginal value  of time. 
The view  of price-wage  rigidity  in the  IS-LM model  turns out  to be 
more subtle and closer to the view  advocated  in this paper. As Barro and 
Grossman  (1971) pointed  out,  the labor market is wholly  irrelevant in a 
macro model  where  the  price level  is predetermined  and  sellers  stand 
ready  to meet  all demand  at that price level.  Alternative  values  of the 
real or nominal wage  have no effect on the level of employment.  Modern 
expositions  of  the  IS-LM model  do  not  invoke  price  rigidity  directly. 
Instead,  they start from a predetermined  nominal wage and derive price 
rigidity from a markup theory of pricing; a good exposition  is Dornbusch 
and  Fischer  (1990,  Chapter  13,  Sections  3  and  4).  The  implicit  labor 
demand  schedule  in  that  version  of  IS-LM is  precisely  flat-the  flat 
marginal  cost  schedule  needed  for a markup  theory  corresponds  to a 
constant marginal product of labor. The modern IS-LM model makes the 
assumption  of a temporarily  rigid nominal  wage.  Labor stands ready to 
supply whatever  volume  of effort is requested  by employers.  The overall 
view  of  the  labor  market  implicit  in  the  modern  IS-LM model  is  an 
extreme version  of Figure 1 in which  labor demand  and labor supply  are 
both perfectly  flat and lie atop one  another. The level of employment  is 
indeterminate  as far as demand  and  supply  in the labor market is con- 
cerned. The indeterminacy  is resolved by the principle of short-run nomi- 
nal wage  rigidity. With respect  to the modern  IS-LM model,  it would  be 
appropriate to think of this paper as providing  some  additional founda- 
tions  for the model's  implicit hypotheses  about labor demand  and sup- 
ply. The model  developed  here is not a rival for IS-LM. 
When  labor demand  and  labor supply  are both  quite flat, any shock 
that shifts either schedule  will have  a large effect on employment.  I will 
not dwell  on the sources  of shocks.  However,  the example I will pursue 
will  be  a product  demand  shock.  When  one  claimant  on  output-for 
example,  the  government-decides  to increase  its demand  for output, 
the  result  is a shift  in labor supply  that brings  an increase  in employ- 
ment.  In the example  worked  out in Section 10, a higher real interest rate 
releases  labor time  from reorganizational  activities  to make it available 
for  goods  production.  The  result  is  similar  to  models  with  high  in- 
tertemporal  substitution  in  labor  supply  arising  from  substitution  be- 
tween  work and time out of the labor market, but in this model,  all of the 
substitution  is  between  the  two  labor market  activities.  I do  not  give 
examples  of other types  of shocks,  but they  would  have  similar effects. 
Lawrence  Summers  has  suggested  calling  this  type  of  equilibrium- 22 *  HALL 
defined  by the intersection  of two  schedules  with nearly equal slope-a 
"fragile" equilibrium.  Although  it is not  part of the  view  taken in this 
paper,  one  could  pursue  this  idea  one  step  further to consider  supply 
and demand  curves that intersect more than once, and view fluctuations 
as movements  from one of the equilibria to the other. 
2. Theoretical  Framework  for  Measuring  the  Elasticity  of 
Labor  Demand 
In this  section  I will  derive  a method  for estimating  the elasticity, /,  of 
the labor demand  schedule.  The method  rests on the idea that shifts in 
labor supply  (and product  demand,  when  the economy  produces  more 
than one product)  trace out the labor demand  schedule.  In competition, 
only  variables  that  affect  the  firm's  technology  can  shift  the  labor de- 
mand schedule.  Any  other variable that affects employment  must oper- 
ate  through  the  supply  of  labor  to  the  firm.  For a firm with  market 
power,  labor demand  also  depends  on  the  elasticity  of demand.  Then 
the supply  shift variables must be ones  that affect neither the technology 
nor the elasticity of product  demand. 
Consider  a firm with  constant-returns  production  function  OF(N,K) 
whose  ratio of price to marginal cost is ,.  The firm faces a product wage 
w. Its first-order condition  for employment  is 
dF 
4w=@=  - 
(2.1)  aN 
Suppose  that the markup ratio evolves  according to 
Alog A =  -  v.  (2.2) 
The random variable v is a white-noise  decrement. 
The change  from one period to the next in the first-order condition  is, 
approximately, 
a2F AN  a2F  AK 
Alog w=  v  0+  +  (2.3)  aN2 dF/dN  aNaK aF/aN 
where  0 is the growth  rate in 0.  Under constant  returns, Labor  Demand,  Supply,  and  Employment  Volatility  *  23 
82F  a2F 
N  +  K  = 0.  (2.4) 
aN2  aNaK 
Consequently, 
N  d2F 
Alog w  =  (An-Ak)  +  0 +  v.  (2.5) 
aF/lN  aN2 
Here An and Ak are proportional  or log changes.  Let 3 be the elasticity of 
labor demand, 
1  N  a2F  - =-  -.  (2.6) 
13  aF/dN aN2 
Then  a compact  form  for decomposing  the  various  influences  on  the 
product wage  is 
1 
Alog w =  - -  (An -  Ak) +  v +  0.  (2.7) 
13 
Equation  (2.7) decomposes  the  actual movements  of the  product  wage 
into three components: 
1.  Changes  associated  with changes  in the labor/capital ratio, -(1/8i)(An 
-  Ak). 
2.  Changes  in productivity,  0. 
3.  An unexplained  residual,  v. 
With convex  technology,  the  elasticity  of labor demand,  f3, must  be 
nonnegative.  The firm's labor demand  schedule  slopes  downward  un- 
der all conditions,  including  nonconvex  technology-it  would  always be 
paradoxical for a firm to hire more labor if the wage  rose. 
3. Econometric  Method 
The  basic  method  I use  to  measure  the  elasticity  of  labor demand  is 
instrumental  variables.  The instruments  measure  exogenous  changes  in 
product demand  and labor supply  that affect a particular industry. These 
changes  move  the industry  along its labor demand  schedule.  The use of 
data for individual  industries  gives  additional  sources  of changes  that 24 *  HALL 
cause movements  along  labor demand.  The variable on the vertical axis 
of the labor supply-and-demand  diagram for a particular industry is the 
product  wage  for that industry-the  ratio of the  industry  wage  to the 
product price for the industry.  Thus changes  in product demand  for the 
industry  shift  the  labor supply  schedule  in terms of the  product  wage 
and trace out the labor demand  schedule. 
Provided  the  instruments  are uncorrelated  with  shifts  of  the  indus- 
try's technology  and with shifts in the elasticity of demand,  the observed 
movements  of  the  product  wage  and  employment  in  response  to 
changes  in  the  instruments  are purely  movements  along  the  labor de- 
mand  schedule  and  not  shifts  of  the  schedule.  For instruments  that 
stimulate product demand,  there are three effects at work. First, employ- 
ment rises.  Second,  the price of the product rises. Third, the wage rises. 
The  locus  traced  out  by  employment  on  the  horizontal  axis  and  the 
product  wage  (ratio of industry  wage  to product  price) on  the vertical 
axis is the labor demand  schedule.  For instruments  that stimulate  labor 
supply,  on the other hand,  the effects  are an increase in employment,  a 
decrease  in price,  and a decrease  in the wage.  Again,  the employment- 
product wage  locus  traces out the labor demand  schedule. 
My assumption  that the change in the markup ratio, v, is uncorrelated 
with  the  instruments  is  just  the  opposite  of  the  assumption  made  by 
Julio Rotemberg  and Michael Woodford  (this volume).  In effect,  Rotem- 
berg  and  Woodford  reverse  the  procedure.  They  take the  elasticity  of 
labor  demand  as  known  a  priori  and  measure  the  correlation  of  the 
markup change  with exogenous  shifts in demand.  By contrast, I take the 
correlation  as known  (to be  zero)  and  measure  the  elasticity. To put  it 
differently, I assume  that markups are noncyclical and show  that, under 
that assumption,  labor demand  and  marginal  cost  are flat. Rotemberg 
and Woodford  assume  that marginal cost is upward  sloping  (and labor 
demand  is downward  sloping)  and  show  that markups  must  be coun- 
tercyclical.  Both  findings  are completely  consistent  with  the  available 
evidence.  One  cannot  choose  between  these  research strategies  on the 
basis of any of the evidence  we consider. 
The basic estimation  Equation (2.7) contains  the productivity  shock 0. 
Estimation efficiency  can be improved  by one of two methods  based on 
the fact that there is information  about 0 in observed  variables other than 
the  variables  in  the  equation.  One  approach  is  to  estimate  the  labor 
demand  equation  jointly with  a productivity  growth  equation.  Bivariate 
estimation  takes advantage  of the high  correlation of the disturbance in 
the  labor  demand  equation  and  the  disturbance  in  the  productivity 
growth  equation.  An  alternative  approach  that  yields  essentially  the 
same efficiency  gain is to exploit the high correlation of the productivity Labor  Demand,  Supply,  and  Employment  Volatility  *  25 
shock across industries  by estimating  a multivariate system consisting  of 
Equation  (2.7) for each  of  a group  of industries.  Experimentation  sug- 
gested  that both  methods  yielded  about the same efficiency  gain. Com- 
bining  the  two  methods  had  little incremental  value.  I have  chosen  to 
use  the  multivariate  approach  in the  work  presented  in this paper,  to 
avoid involvement  in controversies  about productivity  measurement. 
The  data  are sufficiently  noisy  that  estimation  of  the  labor demand 
elasticity  3 separately  for each industry  results in huge  sampling  varia- 
tion.  To reduce  the sampling  variation,  I impose  the constraint that the 
elasticity is the same for all of the industries  within groups of six or fewer 
two-digit  industries. 
The estimation  method  embodying  these  various  principles  is three- 
stage least squares applied to all two-digit industries simultaneously,  with 
constraints  on  the  labor demand  elasticity  across  groups  of industries. 
I normalize  the estimating  equation as in Equation (2.7)-with  the log- 
change  of  the  product  wage  on  the  left  and  the  log-change  in  the 
employment/capital  ratio on  the  right.  The estimated  coefficient  is the 
reciprocal of the demand  elasticity. It is an interesting  econometric  ques- 
tion whether  useful  results  could be obtained  with  the reverse normali- 
zation-employment  change  on  the  left and  product  wage  change  on 
the  right.  That procedure  would  give  direct estimates  of the  elasticity. 
With a single  equation  and a single  instrument,  the two normalizations 
would  give  identical  results.  In the  multivariate  setup  used  here  and 
with  three instruments,  the  results  still come  close  to agreement  when 
each industry  has  its own  elasticity. But imposition  of the constraint  of 
equal elasticities  within  industry  groups has a very different effect in the 
two normalizations  because  of sign effects.  Quite a few industries  have 
small  negative  estimated  values  of  1//3. These  industries  support  the 
general  thrust  of  this  paper  that  the  labor demand  schedule  is  flat or 
even  upward  sloping.  But with  the reverse  normalization,  these  indus- 
tries have  large negative  estimated  values  of  3. The effect of imposing 
the constraint of equal coefficients  within industry  groups is not terribly 
different  from estimating  the coefficient  as the average of the estimates 
for the individual  industries.  In the normalization  I use,  the average of 
1/,3 is  lowered  a little  by  the  inclusion  of  the  negative-1//3 industries. 
These  industries  strengthen  the evidence  that labor demand  is flat. On 
the  other  hand,  with  the  reverse  normalization,  the  average  of  3 is 
dramatically  lowered  by  the  inclusion  of  the  negative-1/,3  industries, 
because they contribute huge  negative  values of  3. The effect is to weaken 
the evidence  for flat or negative  slopes. 
This paper will restrict its attention  to results based on the normaliza- 
tion with  the  product  wage  on  the  left.  The  use  of this  normalization 26  HALL 
amounts  to  a rough  application  of  Bayesian  principles,  with  the  prior 
belief  that it is highly  unlikely  that there are industries  that have  large 
negative  values  of  8.  I note,  however,  that  the  opposing  view  is  not 
ruled  out  by  the  evidence-that  there  are some  industries  with  high 
positive  labor demand  elasticities  and  others  with  high  negative  elas- 
ticities, and that the average elasticity is small. 
4. Data  and  Results  on the  Elasticity  of Labor  Demand 
An instrumental  variable is a variable that is uncorrelated with  the ran- 
dom productivity  shift,  0, and the change  in product demand  elasticity, 
v, but is correlated with  changes  in the labor/capital ratio, An-Ak.  Vari- 
ables measuring  exogenous  shifts in product demand  or in factor supply 
would  be eligible as instruments.  In my empirical work, I use the instru- 
ments  proposed  by Valerie Ramey in related work: changes  in military 
spending,  changes  in the world  oil price,  and the political party of the 
president. 
The data for two-digit  U.S. industries  are taken from the same sources 
as my earlier work on productivity  growth  (Hall, 1990) updated  through 
1986. Labor input  is carefully measured  by combining  information from 
the household  and establishment  surveys  on annual hours of work. The 
wage  is the ratio of nominal  compensation  to annual  hours.  Output  is 
value  added  and  the product  price is the corresponding  NIPA deflator. 
Table 1 presents  the results.  Five of the six groups  have positive  elas- 
ticities.  The elasticities  range  from a little over two  to about eight.  The 
last  column  of  the  table  gives  the  corresponding  elasticities  for  the 
Cobb-Douglas  technology-if  a  is labor's share,  the  elasticity  of labor 
demand  with  a given  capital stock is 1/(1 -  a).  For all industries  except 
food-fiber (SIC 20 to 26) and transportation equipment,  labor demand  is 
more  elastic  than  it would  be in  the  Cobb-Douglas  case  (the negative 
estimate  of  1//3 for communications-utilities-transportation  should  be 
thought  of  as  an  extreme  form  of  flatness-the  product  wage  rises 
slightly  when  an  exogenous  force  raises  employment).  And  Cobb- 
Douglas  is  a stringent  standard.  The  Cobb-Douglas  elasticities  range 
from  2.1  for  the  capital-intensive  communication-utilities-transporta- 
tion  industry  to  5.3  for  the  labor-intensive  transportation  equipment 
industry. 
In summary,  the  empirical  results  on  labor demand  indicate  the  fol- 
lowing:  When  an exogenous  event-a  decline  in oil prices,  increase  in 
military spending,  or election  of  a Democrat  as  president-stimulates 
demand  for  the  output  of  an  industry,  or stimulates  labor supply  by 
affecting  labor  demand  in  other  industries,  the  resulting  increase  in Labor  Demand, Supply, and Employment  Volatility  * 27 
Table 1  ESTIMATES OF THE ELASTICITY  OF LABOR DEMAND 
SIC: Industry 
20: Food and kindred  products 
22: Textile mill products 
23: Apparel and other textile 
products 
24: Lumber and wood  products 
25: Furniture and fixtures 
26: Paper and allied products 
27: Printing and publishing 
28: Chemicals  and allied products 
30: Rubber and miscellaneous  plas- 
tic products 
31: Leather and leather products 
32: Stone,  clay, and glass products 
33: Primary metal industries 
34: Fabricated metal products 
35: Machinery,  except  electrical 
36: Electric and electronic 
equipment 
38: Instruments  and related 
products 
39: Miscellaneous  manufacturing 
industries 
371: Motor vehicles  and equipment 
372: Other transportation  equip- 
ment 
48: Communication 


































Wholesale  trade  0.124  8.065  3.344 
Retail trade  (0.064) 
Notes:  Instruments:  Political  dummy, percent  change in oil prices,  and growth  of real  military  expendi- 
tures. Sample: 1953 to 1986. Estimation  method: Three-stage  least squares with the elasticity  con- 
strained  within industry  groups. 
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employment  is large in relation to the resulting  decrease  in the product 
wage.  The  ratio of  the  two-the  elasticity  of labor demand-is  in the 
range from two  to eight. 
5. Explanations  of Flat  Labor  Demand 
Economists  think,  as  a rule,  that  the  diminishing  marginal product  of 
labor means  that marginal cost rises with output.  Higher demand means 
higher  prices,  or at least  no lower  prices.  Practical experience  is hardly 
conclusive  on  this point.  It is more  expensive  to vacation  in Hawaii  at 
Christmas than in October. But VCRs and many other Christmas goods 
are no more expensive  during December than they are during the rest of 
the  year  (Warner and  Barsky, 1990). Federal Express  charges  more  for 
Saturday delivery, for which there is much less demand,  than they do for 
weekday  delivery. 
Congestion  and agglomeration  are opposing  forces. Standard neoclas- 
sical  economic  models  emphasize  congestion.  Firms face  diminishing 
marginal product  of labor because  the addition  of workers crowds more 
of them  onto  the  same  machines,  and  the resulting  congestion  lowers 
productivity.  But when  coordination  is an important part of production, 
the favorable side  of crowding  may dominate.  Cameras are cheaper on 
47th Street in New  York because  the crowded  stores filled with custom- 
ers  and  salesmen  make  transactions  at  rates  an  order  of  magnitude 
greater than suburban camera stores. 
Crowding  more workers  on the existing  stock of machines  lowers  the 
marginal  product  of each  worker.  For the induced  change  in marginal 
product  to be positive  rather than negative,  the congestion  effect must 
be outweighed  by thick-market effects  or complementarities.  Peter Dia- 
mond  (1982) introduced  thick-market effects.  The basic idea is that the 
costs  of one  productive  activity fall when  related or neighboring  activi- 
ties are at higher levels.  Transaction and search costs are lower in denser 
markets.  Congestion  is good  for productivity.  The analogy  to the  geo- 
graphic distribution  of productivity  is helpful-productivity  is highest in 
dense,  congested  cities such as New  York. 
When  thick-market effects  are dominant,  the marginal product  of la- 
bor is an upward-sloping  function  of total employment.  This schedule 
serves  as the demand  schedule  for labor. It is important to consider  it a 
relation  between  aggregate  employment  and  marginal  product,  how- 
ever. It would  be a paradoxical violation  of second-order  conditions  for 
the level of employment  chosen  by a single firm to be a positive  function 
of the  wage  the  firm faced.  Each firm perceives  a negative  relation be- 
tween  its own  employment  and its own  marginal product of labor. But Labor  Demand,  Supply,  and  Employment  Volatility  *  29 
the positive dependence of its production function on aggregate  activity 
makes its marginal  product a positive function of total employment. 
A very simple example will explain most of what this section has to 
say. Consider first the neoclassical technology where production takes 
place in N separate units: 
y = x  + x+ +  + X  (5.1) 
with a <  1. Suppose the total endowment of the input, x, is 1. Then 
output will be maximized  by allocating  the endowment evenly over all N 
of the productive units. With xi=1/N, total output is N1-a. Any other 
allocation, such as giving the entire endowment to the first unit, will 
produce  less output. With  N > 1 and a < 1, N1-a  exceeds 1. The neoclassi- 
cal conclusion that it is better to avoid congestion applies to this example 
because of the concavity of the technologies of the units. 
Now consider a related technology, where 
y  =  xaX  +  xx  +  X.  4  +  + x  _-1.  (5.2) 
Here the productive units are related to one another in pairs. Each  unit 
has diminishing marginal product of its own input, xi(a <  1), but the 
input used by its counterpart,  xi+,, makes a positive contribution,  mea- 
sured by the elasticity, /3, which is positive. Moreover, the externality 
measured by ,  is strong enough to yield overall  increasing  returns:  a+/3 
> 1. With this technology, congestion or agglomeration  is desirable.  The 
contribution that an increase in the input to one firm makes to the 
output of the other firm in its pair is more than enough to offset the 
diminishing marginal product in the first firm. With uniform allocation 
of the input across firms, total output is N-(a+-1). On the other hand, it 
turns out that the optimal allocation  is to give all of the inputs to a single 
pair  of producers, to take full advantage  of increasing  returns.  Then total 
output is 2-("  -1),  which is larger  for N > 2. The lesson is that  agglomera- 
tion of activity pays off when there are complementarities. 
Now suppose that the firms can purchase the input for a real wage w 
and that each firm takes the level of activity of its counterpart  as given; 
there is no coordination  between the two firms  in the pair.  Profit  maximi- 
zation results in the two factor  demands, 
ax-  1x2=  w  (5.3) 
aCX2-lx  =  W.  1  (5.4) 30 *  HALL 
The unique solution where each firm is basing its factor  demand on the 
actual  choice of the other firm is 
X,  =  X  -  (5.5) 
The crucial point is that this factor demand slopes upward.  At a higher 
level of employment, the marginal product is higher. This conclusion 
depends fundamentally on the lack of coordination between the two 
firms with the complementarity. If the two firms merge or write an 
efficient contract  to deal with the complementarity,  they will behave as a 
firm  with increasing returns, whose factor  demand function cannot pos- 
sibly slope upward. 
Complementarities  in economic activity seem a highly promising  way 
to explain a flat or upward-sloping demand schedule for labor. The 
complementarities  hypothesis seems to have strong support in the data 
in a number of ways. On the other hand, its acceptance  is likely to be 
held back by the lack of a convincing story about the source of comple- 
mentarities.  Just what makes the production  function of the auto indus- 
try shift upward in favorable times? Where is the externality linking 
auto-making  with chemical  production  and hotel-keeping?  Research  has 
not yet answered these difficult  questions. 
The most direct form of evidence on complementarities  comes from 
the measurement of productivity.  According  to the complementarity  hy- 
pothesis,  productivity should  rise in  times  of  high  overall activity. 
Procyclical  productivity  is a well-documented characteristic  of the overall 
economy and most industries. It is essential to sort through some impor- 
tant productivity measurement issues in order to determine if the evi- 
dence supports the complementarity hypothesis uniquely, whether it 
supports the hypothesis along with some alternatives, or if procyclical 
productivity is plainly just an artifact of incorrect measurement. Not 
surprisingly,  the conclusion is ambiguous. After correcting  the standard 
Solow productivity measure for problems caused by market power, I 
find that it remains strongly procyclical  in many industries. When the 
economy in general surges, or when demand for the output of the indus- 
try itself rises, productivity  rises. 
A second important piece of evidence has to do with inventories. A 
firm with a neoclassical technology and no external complementarities 
will use inventories to offset the increase  in cost that occurs  when output 
rises. Inventories will rise when firms expect future output to exceed 
current  output, as firms hedge against the increase  in cost. With  comple- 
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when  output  is higher,  and  inventory  hedging  will  go  in the  opposite 
direction. Firms will shed inventories  in times of low output and accumu- 
late in  times  of  high  output.  Work by  Valerie Ramey  (1991), Kenneth 
West (1986), and others  has  shown  decisively  that inventory  accumula- 
tion follows  the thick-market,  not the neoclassical  pattern. 
6. Cyclical  Productivity 
Robert Solow  (1957) established  the  general  framework  within  which 
productivity  has  been  measured  ever  since.  Consider  a firm that pro- 
duces  output  Q with  a production  function  OF(K,N) using  capital K and 
labor N as inputs.  O is an index of Hicks-neutral technical progress.  The 
firm faces a stochastic  demand  for its output,  possibly  perfectly elastic. It 
faces a labor market where  the firm can engage  any amount  of labor at 
the  same  wage,  w.  The firm chooses  its labor input  so as to maximize 
profit. This choice is made after the realization of demand.  Some time in 
advance of the realization of demand,  the firm chooses  a capital stock, to 
maximize  expected  profit.  Again,  the firm is a price-taker in the market 
for the rental of capital services  at price c. Solow  derived  a relationship 
involving  output  growth,  product price, capital and labor input,  and the 
wage  rate, under  the assumptions  of competition  and constant  returns 
to scale. The relationship  is 
t =  Aq, -  atAnt -  (1 -  at)Akt,  (6.1) 
where  0 is the rate of Hicks-neutral technical progress  (Alog 0),  Aq  is the 
rate of growth  of output  (Alog Q), a is the  elasticity  of the  production 
function  with  respect  to labor input,  An is the  rate of growth  of labor 
(Alog N),  and  Ak is the rate of growth  of capital (Alog K). This measure 
has come  to be known  as total factor productivity  because,  unlike mea- 
sures  that consider  only  output  and  labor input,  it accounts  for capital 
input  and,  in a more  general  form,  for all other types  of inputs.  In the 
version  I will consider  here,  the elasticity a is measured  as labor's share 
of total cost. For a further discussion  of analytical issues  surrounding  the 
Solow  residual,  see Hall (1990). 
Empirical results  reveal  statistically  unambiguous  and  economically 
important correlations between  the instruments  and measured productiv- 
ity growth in many industries.  Table 5.2 in Hall (1990) shows  the results of 
regressing  the Solow  residual on the instruments  for a number of indus- 
tries. Contrary to hypothesis,  when  military spending  or an oil price drop 
stimulates  output  and employment,  measured  productivity  rises. A sec- 
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ity residuals  with  each other and with  aggregate  output.  Table 2 shows 
the correlation of the productivity  residual of the industry with the sum of 
the productivity  residuals for all industries.  The second column shows  the 
correlation of the industry  residual  with  the rate of growth  of real GNP. 
One  important  interpretation  of  the  findings  about  the  behavior  of 
the  productivity  residual  in  the  short  run  stresses  the  role of comple- 
mentarities  across  industries.  A  statistical  model  that  interprets  the 
positive  correlation  of  each  industry  with  aggregate  activity  finds  an 
elasticity  of  industry  output  with  the  aggregate  of  about  0.45,  a very 
powerful  complementarity  (Caballero and  Lyons,  1989). Working with 
Table  2.  CORRELATIONS  BETWEEN  INDUSTRY  PRODUCTIVITY 
GROWTH  AND AGGREGATE  VARIABLES 
Correlation 
of industry  Correlation 
productivity  of industry 
growth  with  productivity 
aggregate  growth  with 
productivity  aggregate 
SIC:  Industry  growth  real  GNP 
20: Food and kindred products  0.245  0.147 
22: Textile  mill products  0.219  0.083 
23: Apparel  and other textile products  -0.005  0.033 
24: Lumber  and wood products  0.152  0.065 
25:  Furniture  and fixtures  0.542  0.498 
26: Paper  and allied products  0.562  0.512 
27:  Printing  and publishing  0.509  0.395 
28: Chemicals  and allied products  0.684  0.527 
30: Rubber  and miscellaneous plastic products  0.411  0.270 
31: Leather  and leather products  0.310  0.285 
32: Stone, clay, and glass products  0.757  0.597 
33: Primary  metal industries  0.632  0.738 
34: Fabricated  metal products  0.365  0.394 
35: Machinery,  except electrical  0.417  0.389 
36: Electric  and electronic  equipment  0.533  0.487 
38: Instruments  and related  products  0.262  0.219 
39:  Miscellaneous  manufacturing  industries  0.387  0.263 
371:  Motor  vehicles and equipment  0.772  0.665 
372:  Other transportation  equipment  0.021  -0.118 
48: Communication  0.247  0.117 
49: Electric,  gas, and sanitary  services  0.325  0.251 
Transportation  0.762  0.605 
Wholesale  Trade  0.643  0.433 
Retail  Trade  0.657  0.738 
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very  detailed  four-digit  data,  Bartelsman,  Caballero,  and  Lyons  (1991) 
find that the most  powerful  complementarities  in the short run are with 
downstream  customer  industries,  whereas  those  operating  in  the 
longer run are with upstream  supplier industries. 
In earlier work  (Hall,  1990), I suggested  that increasing  returns could 
explain some of the findings  about the correlation of productivity growth 
with exogenous  instruments  and correlation across industries.  Caballero 
and Lyons argue that their empirical work shows  that complementarities 
are superior to increasing returns as an explanation of procyclical produc- 
tivity. A potent  argument  holds  that we should  never observe increasing 
returns  in  easily  variable  factors when  output  can be  stored.  Instead, 
production  should  take place episodically.  In the case of a storable out- 
put, increasing  returns can make the marginal product of labor schedule 
flat,  but  not  upward  sloping.  Only  complementarities  can  make  the 
schedule  slope  upward. 
6.1 QUALIFICATIONS  TO THE  FINDINGS  ON CYCLICAL 
PRODUCTIVITY 
The evidence  on  measured  productivity  is not definitive.  The principal 
alternative  explanations  of  cyclical  fluctuations  in  productivity  invoke 
measurement  errors in  labor and  capital  input.  If each  contraction  of 
output  involves  an  unmeasured  contraction  in labor and  capital,  then 
the apparent  flatness  of labor demand  may be an artifact of those  mea- 
surement  errors. A detailed  discussion  of measurement  errors appears 
in Hall (1990). 
Hours of work are reasonably well measured in the U.S. economy. The 
most  likely  source  of  measurement  error in  labor input  is  not  in  the 
quantity of hours,  but in the amount  of effort per hour. The best case for 
an alternative  explanation  of cyclical productivity  fluctuations  based  on 
measurement  problems  in  labor input  runs  along  the  following  lines: 
When  demand  is strong,  workers  accomplish  more per hour. They are 
paid for their accomplishments,  but not in cash on a current basis.  The 
pay is in the form of low  accomplishments  in the next slump.  Workers 
suffer a disamenity  from higher rates of accomplishment  and firms per- 
ceive the disamenity  in the form of an implicit piece-rate wage for accom- 
plishments.  Long-term  implicit  contracts  pass  on  the  psychic  costs  as 
implicit financial costs to the firm. 
All of the ingredients  I have listed are essential  to make the measure- 
ment error explanation  work.  If there is no disamenity  to accomplishing 
more,  the  firm is not  in equilibrium  unless  it is asking  for the maximal 
rate of accomplishments  in recessions  as well as booms.  Cyclical fluctua- 
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payment  for higher  effort cannot  occur on a current basis.  If it did,  real 
compensation  per hour would  fluctuate along with productivity. In fact, 
hourly  compensation  is  very  stable  over  wide  fluctuations  in employ- 
ment,  output,  and  productivity  (see  Figure 5.2  in Hall,  1990). But the 
majority of  workers  work  under  long-term  employment  relationships, 
so it is certainly possible  that there are fluctuations  in work effort as part 
of the workings  of implicit employment  contracts. 
The same  story  can be  told  about  capital.  Productivity  measures  as- 
sume  that  the  firm  uses  the  services  of  all of  the  capital available.  If 
equipment  and structures  deteriorate over time and not because  of use, 
there is no pure user cost of capital. It costs a firm no more to use all of its 
capital than to use part, so it would  be inexplicable if part of the existing 
capital stock were  unused.  In that case,  there would  be no possibility  of 
cyclical errors in  measuring  capital input.  But if there is a user  cost  of 
capital, firms have a capital supply  decision  that is formally similar to the 
labor supply  decision.  Optimal capital utilization  declines  in recessions. 
Productivity  measurements  based on the assumption  of full capital utili- 
zation  overstate  cyclical  fluctuations  in  productivity.  Johnson's  (1989) 
careful review  of this issue,  however,  finds little support for the user cost 
explanation  of variations  in utilization. 
One  of  the  assumptions  underlying  Solow's  productivity  measure- 
ment method  in the form used  in my work is that firms choose  the level 
of capital to minimize  expected  cost.  This assumption  rules out chronic 
excess  capacity. If firms systematically  overinvest,  the marginal product 
of capital will  fall short  of  the  real rental cost  of capital.  The elasticity 
used  for capital in the productivity  formula overstates  the true elasticity 
of the production  function  with respect to capital, and, as a result, there 
is  an  understatement  of  the  true  elasticity  with  respect  to  labor. The 
result is to make measured  productivity  procyclical when  true productiv- 
ity is not.  One interpretation  of the finding  of procyclical productivity  is 
chronic excess  capacity in many industries.  This interpretation presents 
no  problems  for  the  message  of  this  paper.  Chronic  excess  capacity 
almost  certainly  leads  to  flat labor demand-the  basic explanation  for 
the standard view  of an downward  sloping  marginal product schedule  is 
the inefficiency  of crowding  more and more workers onto a limited stock 
of machines. 
7. Inventories 
The behavior  of inventories  of storable goods  provides  another  type  of 
evidence  on  marginal  cost  and  the  slope  of  the  marginal  product  of 
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ods  when  marginal  cost  is  low  and  the  marginal  product  of  labor is 
high.  Under neoclassical  assumptions,  these  periods  should  be slumps, 
so firms should  use  inventories  to make production  smoother  over time 
than  sales  are.  With  external  complementarities  and  thick-market  ef- 
fects,  times  of lowest  cost and highest  productivity  will be the times  of 
highest  output.  Firms will  schedule  high  output  to coincide  with  times 
of high  sales.  They  will  build  inventories  during  peak  periods,  rather 
than depleting  inventories  as they would  under neoclassical  conditions. 
The  cyclical  behavior  of  inventories  provides  a  simple  way  to  distin- 
guish  a neoclassical  convex  economy  from an economy  with  important 
complementarities. 
This  evidence  seems  to  favor  complementarities.  First,  it  has  been 
known  for some  years  that  production  is  more,  not  less  volatile  than 
sales.  Blinder (1986), West (1986), and others have noted  this departure 
from the predictions  of neoclassical  models.  But the excess  volatility  of 
production  is  not  conclusive.  If costs  vary  over  time,  the  neoclassical 
firm will  take advantage  of periods  of low  cost to build inventories  and 
will  deplete  them  during  times  of high  cost.  Production  will vary over 
time even  if sales are completely  stable. A simple comparison  of volatil- 
ity is not  enough  if there  are other  sources  of production  volatility  be- 
yond  variations in sales. 
Valerie Ramey (1991) demonstrates  fairly convincingly  that cost varia- 
tions  do not  explain  why  firms accumulate  inventories  during times  of 
high production.  She examines  the joint behavior of output and finished 
goods  inventories  in  industries  that  produce  to  stock  rather than  to 
order.  The  following  simplification  of  Ramey's  approach  shows  how 
inventory  behavior  reveals  the curvature of technology. 
Consider  a  profit-maximizing  firm.  Within  a  broader  optimization 
problem through  which  the firm determines  its sales,  there is a subprob- 
lem of minimizing  the cost of those  sales.  Suppose  the expected  cost of 
producing  to meet  given  sales is proportional  to 
2Et  ['  +  (x,- 
- 
s)2]  (7.1)  2 
T=t 
Here  Et is  the  expectation  conditional  on  information  at  time  t,  y  is 
output,  x is the end-of-period  stock of finished-goods  inventories,  and s 
is the level  of sales.  The parameter  y controls the curvature of the tech- 
nology;  if  the  firm perceives  upward-sloping  marginal  cost,  y will  be 
positive.  The parameter a controls the inventory/sales  ratio. An identity 
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t =  Xt-1  +  Yt -  St.  (7.2) 
A first-order condition  necessary  for the optimal  scheduling  of produc- 
tion is 
Et[y(y, -  Yt+l)  + xt -  as+]  =  0.  (7.3) 
This condition  characterizes  the cost-minimizing  policy, for negative  as 
well as positive  values  of y (see Ramey, 1991). 
Now  let 
ht =  xt -  at+1  (7.4) 
=  Xt -  Xt_1 -  (ast+l  -  Xt-_). 
The variable ht is inventory  investment  in excess  of the amount  needed 
to maintain  the level  of inventories  at its usual relation to sales; ht mea- 
sures  inventory  investment  undertaken  to  smooth  production  plus  a 
purely random element  related to surprises in sales.  The first-order con- 
dition in terms of ht is 
Etht  =  -y(Yt  -  Etyt,+).  (7.5) 
Alternatively, 
ht =  -y(yt  -  Yt+i) +  Et  (7.6) 
Here e is an expectation  error satisfying  EtEt  = 0. 
Equation  (7.6) strips the first-order condition  to its bare essentials.  A 
firm with sharply rising marginal cost (y >> 0) will deplete its inventories 
by setting  ht<O when  it is producing  more  this period  than it plans  to 
produce  next  period  (Yt-Yt+i >  0). Note  that the inventory  draw-down 
affects the magnitude  of yt-yt+i; ht, Yt,  and Yt+l  are all variables controlled 
directly by the firm. When the optimal output plan calls for lower output 
this  period  than  next  period,  the  firm  with  rising  marginal  cost  will 
accumulate inventories  in excess  of the level required by maintenance  of 
the inventory/sales  ratio. 
Rising  marginal  cost  has  a  sharp  and  robust  implication:  When  an 
outside  event  stimulates  product  demand  temporarily,  it  should  also 
cause an inventory  draw-down,  in the sense  of a negative  value of ht. To 
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Yt-yt+i should  be negatively  correlated with ht. The negative  of the ratio 
of the  covariances  is  the  instrumental  variable estimator  of  y.  By con- 
trast, the firm with  flat marginal cost is indifferent  to the scheduling  of 
production.  Its only  objective  is to maintain  its inventory/sales  ratio at 
the  prescribed  level  c,  so  it always  plans  for ht =  0.  An  instrumental 
variable positively  correlated with Yt-Yt+i  will have zero correlation with 
excess inventory  accumulation.  The instrumental variable estimator for y 
will be zero. 
For a firm with  decreasing  marginal cost (y<0),  it is efficient to bunch 
production.  The firm would  produce its output for all periods in the first 
period  but  for  the  cost  of  departing  from  the  normal  inventory/sales 
ratio, c.  Even in the face of that cost,  the firm amplifies  fluctuations  in 
output  so as to obtain the economies  of bunching  output.  Equation (7.6) 
shows  that the  firm builds  extra inventories  in the same  periods  when 
current  output  exceeds  expected  future  output.  An  instrument  posi- 
tively correlated with Yt-Yt+i  will also be positively  correlated with ht, and 
the IV estimate  of y will be negative. 
Ramey's  model  as estimated  is considerably  more elaborate than the 
one  just  discussed.  The  cost  function  is cubic in output  and  the linear 
term  depends  on  the  wage,  the  price  of  materials,  and  the  price  of 
energy.  There is a time  trend  in the  quadratic term.  There are costs  of 
adjustment  of  the  level  of  output  in  the  form of a term involving  the 
square of yt-yt-Y1 Finally, there are random shifts in the technology  itself, 
in the adjustment  cost term, and in the target inventory/sales  ratio. 
In Ramey's  work,  the exogenous  variables that shift product demand 
and  do  not  shift  product  supply  are three  measures  of federal military 
spending,  the  relative  price  of  oil,  a dummy  variable for the  political 
party  of  the  president,  and  population.  The  seven  industries  Ramey 
studies  are  food,  tobacco,  apparel,  chemicals,  petroleum,  and  autos. 
Except for the auto industry,  a dummy  for auto strikes also serves  as an 
instrument.  For the  tobacco  industry,  a set  of  variables  characterizing 
federal regulation  is included.  In all seven  industries,  the estimate  of y, 
the slope  of the marginal cost schedule,  is negative.  In four of the seven 
industries,  the  point  estimate  of  y  is  more  than  two  standard  errors 
below  zero,  so  the  evidence  against  rising  marginal cost  is statistically 
unambiguous.  All  seven  of  the  industries  tend  to  bunch  production 
during  times  of  high  sales.  They  typically  accumulate  inventories  be- 
yond  the amount  needed  to maintain the normal inventory/sales  ratio at 
the same  time  that output  is strong  because  sales  are high.  Firms with 
rising marginal cost would  behave  in the opposite  way, building  inven- 
tory stocks  in times  of weak  sales  and drawing  them  down  when  sales 
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bunching  is  inconsistent  with  rising  marginal  cost  and  downward- 
sloping  labor demand. 
8. Flatness  of Labor  Supply 
I turn now  to  the  labor supply  side  of the  story. I find  the  concept  of 
organizational  capital to be helpful  in explaining  the argument  made in 
this  paper,  although  one  does  not  have  to believe  that organizational 
capital is well defined  to accept the flatness of labor supply. An economy 
has  high  organizational  capital  when  it  has  successfully  matched  its 
heterogeneous  resources  to  each  other  in  a way  that  achieves  a high 
level  of output.  Organizational  capital is built by the matching  process. 
Most  important  is  the  matching  of  workers  to  jobs-the  building  of 
teams  of  managers,  desk  workers,  troubleshooters,  and  production 
workers.  The allocation  of workers  to the  stock  of fixed  capital is also 
part of the process  of organizational  capital accumulation.  Because many 
organizational  decisions  deal  with  the  question  of  whether  or not  to 
operate units of production  with substantial fixed costs when  they are in 
operation,  reorganization  often  involves  large, sudden  changes.  As Da- 
vis and  Haltiwanger  (1990) show,  large cutbacks in employment  at the 
plant level  are a central feature of recessions. 
Organizational  capital deteriorates  over time. Products and capital be- 
come obsolete.  Workers age and may lose their comparative advantages 
in their current jobs. An economy  producing flat out with low unemploy- 
ment and low rates of new job matching will gradually suffer a decline in 
productivity  relative  to the  level  that could  be achieved  by pausing  to 
reorganize. 
The way many professionals  run their own offices provides an analogy 
that may be useful.  During periods of intense  effort, one's office becomes 
more and more disorganized.  Piles of unsorted materials develop  first on 
desks and tables and later on the floor. As disorganization  cumulates and 
the office's level of organizational  capital deteriorates further and further, 
the professional's  productivity begins to suffer. Finally, at the first letup in 
the need  to produce  output,  the professional  turns to reorganizing  the 
office.  Measured  output  may  be  low  during  that period,  but  the  time 
spent reorganizing  pays off in its contribution to future productivity. That 
time represents  a type of capital accumulation. 
The  concept  of  organizational  capital  involves  some  challenging  is- 
sues  of ownership.  In particular, search theory generally concludes  that 
employer  and  worker  share  the  benefit  of  the  bargain  created  by  an 
improved  job  match.  Can  a  free  market  ensure  that  a  decentralized 
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marginal product of  labor in  goods  production equals the marginal 
product in the creation of organizational  capital?  The model will make 
that assumption. However, I think that the basic conclusion-that  the 
allocation of labor between the two activities is highly sensitive to cur- 
rent goods demand-carries  over to more realistic models that recog- 
nize the limits of decentralization. 
Reorganization  may suffer from congestion effects-whose  influence 
is similar  to adjustment costs in the accumulation  of physical capital-or 
from agglomeration efficiencies. In the model developed in the next 
section, I assume, in effect, that congestion and agglomeration  just off- 
set each other. The technology for building organizational  capital  is lin- 
ear, rather than concave (as it would be if congestion dominated) or 
convex (as it would be if agglomeration dominated). Specifically,  one 
hour of a worker's time devoted to job seeking or other organizational 
activities builds one unit of organizational  capital. The flatness of labor 
supply to goods production follows directly from this assumption of 
linearity.  Work  time diverted from goods production  generates a flow of 
new organizational  capital. Instantaneously,  the flow has no effect on 
the magnitude of the stock. Hence the marginal  product of time spent 
building organizational capital is independent of the amount of time 
currently being spent. The slope of labor supply arises only from the 
influence of the level of goods employment on the marginal  product of 
organizational capital. The marginal product schedule is precisely the 
labor  supply schedule to goods production. 
One of the implications of this hypothesis is that the job-finding  rate 
for one job searcher  is not sensitive to the number  of other searchers.  In 
particular,  in recessions, time spent looking for or waiting for work is 
almost as productive as it is in booms. The primary  evidence is Blan- 
chard and Diamond's (1990) finding that job-finding rates for unem- 
ployed workers are almost the same in recessions as in booms. Reces- 
sions are periods of greater total volume of job changes, but are not 
times when it takes longer to find work. 
In this model, labor is allocated between production and creation of 
organizational  capital.  The amount of labor  available  for the combination 
of the two activities is a constant, independent of the real wage, real 
interest rate, or other relative prices. In other words, substitution of 
work and leisure is not part of the story of employment fluctuations-in 
this respect, the model takes exactly the opposite view from the RBC 
model. The model developed here considers only the allocation  of labor 
between the two activities; it is not a general equilibrium  model. The 
essential relative price that connects labor allocation to the rest of the 
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One  simple  way  to  think  of  the  model  is  that  it  describes  a  small 
economy  embedded  in  a large  world  economy  with  a single  tradable 
good.  The  small  economy  is  a price-taker with  respect  to  the  relative 
price of current and future deliveries  of the good.  Alternatively, one can 
think of the  real interest  rate as the  economic  signal  of the urgency  of 
current  production  of  goods  in  a closed  economy.  When  product  de- 
mand  is high  today  relative  to the  future,  a higher  real interest  rate is 
needed  to clear the market for delivery  of current goods.  One source of 
high product demand  could be higher military purchases,  as studied  by 
Barro (1980) in  a model  where  the  real interest  rate clears  the  goods 
market. Another could be a shift of preferences toward current consump- 
tion,  as  in  Baxter  and  King  (1990).  A  third  could  be  a  spontaneous 
element  in physical  capital accumulation,  as in Hall (1991). In any case, 
the mechanism  to be described  transmits an increase in product demand 
into an increase  in employment. 
Although  there is reasonable evidence that exogenous  increases in prod- 
uct demand  raise the real interest rate in the U.S. economy  (Hall, 1980), I 
think it is important to emphasize  that observed real interest rates may be 
poorly correlated with the variable contemplated  by the model. In the first 
place,  absent  markets for indexed  securities,  there is the problem of re- 
moving the expected inflation component  from observed nominal interest 
rates. In the second  place, agency  problems may drive a wedge  between 
the real rate applied by business  managers and the rate observed in securi- 
ties markets. In view of these problems,  I prefer to think of the real rate in 
the model as the shadow  price of current use of goods.  In this framework, 
I would  encourage  the  reader  to  think  of the  model  as describing  the 
effects  of shifts  in product  demand  on employment,  rather than the ef- 
fects of the real interest  rate on employment. 
Let 
N: employment  in goods  production 
N: total labor supply,  a constant  independent  of the real wage  and the 
real interest rate 
G: stock of organizational  capital 
8:  depreciation  rate of organizational  capital 
K: stock of physical  capital 
w: real wage 
r:  exogenous  real interest  rate. 
The technology  in goods  production  has constant  returns to scale in the 
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(Marshallian)  demand  for  labor  in  goods  production  is  the  marginal 
product of labor, aF(N,G,K)/IN. 
The  technology  for the  creation  of organizational  capital is that one 
unit of labor diverted  from goods  production  creates one unit of capital. 
Consequently,  organizational  capital accumulation  is total labor supply 
less  labor employed  in  goods  production  and  less  the  replacement  of 
depreciated  capital: 
=  N-N-  N  G.  (8.1) 
The supply  schedule  for labor in the  goods  sector is the marginal loss 
from diverting  a unit  of labor from organizational  capital accumulation 
to goods  production.  The marginal loss is the present value of the stream 
of future marginal products  of the organizational  capital. Little is lost by 
evaluating  the  future  stream  under  the  assumption  of an unchanging 
interest rate and unchanging  marginal product (an earlier version  of the 
paper  showed  how  to  solve  the  problem  more  precisely,  but  little  is 
added  by the extra precision).  Thus labor supply  is 
1  aF(N,G,K)  (8.2)  --  .  (8.2)  r+8  dG 
The slope  of labor supply  is 
1  a2F(N,G,K) 
r+58  aGN 
If organizational  capital  and  labor  are  sufficiently  complementary  in 
goods  production,  the  labor supply  curve  slopes  upward-the  higher 
the level  of employment,  the  higher  the marginal product  of organiza- 
tional  capital and  hence  the  higher  the  marginal loss  from diverting  a 
worker from organizational  capital formation  to goods  production.  But 
the  slope  of labor  supply  is  not  restricted  by  theory.  If organizational 
capital and  labor are sufficiently  substitutable,  labor supply  can  slope 
downward.  Convexity  of the technology  does  not place a restriction on 
the sign of the cross partial derivative,  &2F/aGaN. 
In times of high current product demand  (a high real interest rate), the 
labor supply  schedule  shifts  downward-at  any  given  level  of  goods 
employment,  the  present  value  of  the  marginal  product  of  organiza- 
tional  capital  falls  because  the  discount  rate  rises.  The  goods  sector 
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in  Figure  1.  The  economy  substitutes  toward  goods  production  and 
away  from  the  formation  of  organizational  capital.  As  goods  employ- 
ment rises,  the real wage  falls. 
If p is the elasticity  of labor demand  with respect to the real wage  and 
A is  the  elasticity  of  labor  supply  with  respect  to  the  real wage  (the 
reciprocal of the cross-elasticity  of the marginal product of organizational 
capital),  then  the  elasticity  of  equilibrium  goods  employment  with  re- 
spect to the rental price of organizational  capital (r+  ) is 
(8.4) 
1/3+ 1/A; 
Thus, as depicted  in Figure 1, a high elasticity of labor demand,  f3, and a 
high elasticity of labor supply, A, lead to high sensitivity of goods employ- 
ment  to changes  in product  demand,  mediated  by the real interest rate. 
I have  already  discussed  the  evidence  on  the  elasticity  of labor de- 
mand,  f3. At this stage,  there does not seem to be a good way to measure 
the cross partial derivative,  d2F/IGdN or the corresponding  elasticity  of 
labor supply,  A. The observed  sensitivity  of goods  employment  to shifts 
in goods  demand  suggests  that the cross partial is small and A is large; 
this proposition  does  not contradict any well-known  piece  of evidence. 
There is evidence  on  one  important  part of the  model  developed  in 
this section,  namely  the assumption  that one unit of labor produces  one 
unit of organizational  capital. This assumption  forbids congestion  in the 
creation  of  organizational  capital.  An  important  part of  the  organiza- 
tional  capital of the  economy  is the  stock of worker-job  matches.  The 
linearity assumption  holds  that the rate of creation of new  matches  per 
hour of job search is the same in booms,  when  the number of job search- 
ers is small, as it is in recessions,  when  the number is large. I will review 
empirical findings  on this point. 
9. The  Linear  Relation  between  Job  Search  and 
Accumulation  of Organizational  Capital 
A distinctive  feature of the model  in this paper is the hypothesis  that a 
linear technology  transforms  labor time into organizational  capital. As I 
noted  earlier,  congestion  in  the  worker-job  matching  process  would 
cause diminishing  marginal creation of organizational  capital per unem- 
ployed  worker as the volume  of unemployment  increased.  The supply of 
labor to production  of goods  and services  would  be more upward  slop- 
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would  have the opposite  effect. Does the hypothesis  that congestion  and 
agglomeration  are absent or offsetting  find any support in the data? 
Blanchard and Diamond  (1990) have studied  flows  in the labor market 
in  considerable  detail.  The  flow  of workers  into  jobs  from unemploy- 
ment  may be considered  a rough  measure  of the flow  of newly  created 
organizational  capital. Then the relation between  the flow of time spent 
in unemployment  and the flow of workers to employment  measures  the 
relevant technology.  If the technology  were one of strict proportionality, 
the hazard rate-the  monthly  probability of a job-seeker  finding  a new 
job-would  be the same when  unemployment  is low or high.  Blanchard 
and  Diamond  find  that  the  hazard  rate falls  slightly  when  unemploy- 
ment  rises-a  recession  that  raises  unemployment  by  two  percentage 
points  reduces  the  job-finding  rate from  a normal  level  of  24.0% per 
month  to  21.8% per  month.  There  are two  reasons  to  think  that  this 
figure  overstates  the  structural response  to a shift in product  demand. 
First, there are mix effects over the business  cycle. In a recession,  a larger 
fraction of the unemployed  are experienced  workers who  probably have 
lower job-finding  rates under any conditions  (I am not aware of any data 
on job-finding  rates by experience,  but data from the Current Population 
Survey  show  longer  duration  of unemployment  for older workers  and 
for men,  and both of these  characteristics are positively  correlated with 
experience).  Second,  some  of the fluctuations  in unemployment  consid- 
ered  in  Blanchard and  Diamond's  work  are the  result  of  spontaneous 
shifts in the job-finding  rate. A decline in job-finding will result in higher 
unemployment.  Hence  there may be a simultaneity  bias in the direction 
of apparent congestion  effects. 
Although  Blanchard and Diamond  find that the flow of workers from 
job search to employment  rises during recessions,  they also find that the 
flow from not-in-the-labor-force  (N) to employment  (E) falls in recessions 
(see  their Fig.  9,  p.  117). The decline  in the N  -  E hazard rate is very 
small, because  the number of people  out of the labor force is large. At the 
narrowest  level,  the  behavior  of  job  matching  for people  not  actively 
looking  for work is irrelevant for the question  raised here,  which  has to 
do with the success  rate for those actively looking.  However,  the narrow 
view  puts  too much  faith on the ability of the unemployment  survey  to 
identify  active job searchers.  In order to interpret the N -  E flow within 
the framework  of this paper, one would  have to know  something  about 
the cyclical movements  of the number  of people  classified  as not in the 
labor force  who  are  actually  active  searchers.  I am  not  aware  of  any 
evidence  on  the  sign  of this  relationship.  The data used  by Blanchard 
and Diamond  on people  out of the labor force but desiring  work do not 
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Davis and Haltiwanger  (1990) (D-H)  provide data on the volume  of job 
matching  in manufacturing.  They observe  quarterly changes  in the em- 
ployment  levels  of individual  plants.  If plants  with  rising employment 
never  lost  or terminated  workers,  and if plants  with  declining  employ- 
ment never hired workers,  then the D-H  data would reveal the volume of 
new matches  directly. Instead,  their data understate actual movements  of 
workers.  My impression  is that the understatement  is not a serious prob- 
lem in interpreting  the data, but confirming that impression  is a topic for 
further research. Under the hypothesis  of no counterflows,  D-H  consider 
the volume  of employment  declines  as a measure of job terminations and 
the volume  of employment  increases as a measure of newly  created jobs. 
From these,  they derive two measures  of new  matches.  One is an upper 
bound  that is attained in the case where  every worker who  departs goes 
off to another industry and every worker who is hired comes from another 
industry.  The other is a lower  bound  that is attained if every  departing 
worker is hired within  the same industry  (when  growth exceeds  shrink- 
age) or if every new  hire comes  from those just leaving jobs in the same 
industry  (when  shrinkage  exceeds  growth). 
D-H  document  the positive  relationship  between  unemployment  and 
the  volume  of job matches  (Table 8,  p.  164). The issue  for this  paper, 
however,  is not whether  the marginal product of time spent looking  for 
work is positive,  but rather if it declines with increases in the number of job 
seekers.  In that connection,  I have  looked  at the  statistical relation be- 
tween the D-H  job-matching flows,  the total civilian unemployment  rate, 
and  the  squared  unemployment  rate (standard  errors in parentheses): 
Upper  bound measure  of job-matching  flow 
mt = 0.204  -  0.80ut +  10.5ut2. 
(3.17)  (21.0) 
Lower  bound measure  of job-matching  flow 
me  =  0.292  -  5.3ut + 40.3u2. 
(3.3)  (22.2) 
In both cases,  the marginal product  of unemployment  in producing  job 
matches  rises with  unemployment,  according  to the positive  coefficient 
on squared unemployment.  For the upper-bound  measure,  the positive 
coefficient  could  easily  have  arisen  from  sampling  variation.  For the 
lower-bound  measure,  there is only a small likelihood  that the nonlinear- 
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Blanchard and Diamond's  data suggest  small departures  from linear- 
ity in the direction  of congestion  effects-diminishing  marginal value of 
time spent  looking  for work as the number  of people  looking  increases. 
D-H's  data, on the other hand,  show  some  signs of increasing  marginal 
value  of time  spent  looking.  Tentatively, it appears  to me  that the  hy- 
pothesis  of linear transformation of time into organizational capital is not 
unreasonable.  Plainly this is an area where  further research will pay off. 
10. General  Equilibrium  Summary 
Recall that the  model  of the allocation  of labor between  goods  produc- 
tion and creation of organizational  capital reached the following  relation 
between  the real interest  rate and the level of employment: 
N -  N*  1  r-r*  '"  -'  ^=  ' 
.  (10.1) 
N*  1/,8+1/A r+6 
The variables with  asterisks  are base values  and those  without  asterisks 
are perturbed  values  due  to  a  product  demand  shock.  The  empirical 
work  reported  earlier suggested  that the  labor demand  elasticity,  3, is 
around 5. Even with  Cobb-Douglas  technology,  the elasticity is around 
3.  To illustrate  the  magnitudes  involved,  I will  assume  that  the  labor 
supply  elasticity,  A (in  the  sense  of  the  relation between  the  marginal 
product  of organizational  capital and  employment),  is 2.  I will  further 
assume  that organizational  capital deteriorates  10% per year. The result- 
ing elasticity of employment  with respect to the rental price of organiza- 
tional capital is 1.4. Small changes  in the urgency of goods production,  as 
measured  by the shadow  real interest  rate r, generate  large movements 
of labor between  goods  employment  and building organizational capital. 
To complete  the  model,  suppose  that d is a product  demand  distur- 
bance stated as a proportion  of GNP, and that the reduced form equation 
relating the shadow  real interest  rate to the demand  disturbance is 
r- r* 
+  =  yd.  (10.2)  r*+5 
A representative  value  for y might  be  0.5-a  shift in product  demand 
equal to 1% of GNP might  raise the shadow  real interest rate by 7 basis 
points.  Then  the  elasticity  of employment  with  respect  to the  demand 
shift would  be (0.5)  x  (1.4) = 0.7, which  is in line with direct regression 
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11. Conclusions 
Most  macroeconomists  agree  that research  should  take unemployment 
seriously.  The  conspicuous  fact  that  large  numbers  of  workers  move 
from employment  to unemployment  in the course of a recession  calls for 
real economic  analysis.  Efforts to make wage  rigidity the starting point 
for a model  of the high substitutability  of work and unemployment  have 
not been widely  accepted,  for lack of good underlying  economic rational- 
ization.  The model  in this paper makes  wage  rigidity a derived  conclu- 
sion rather than the starting point. 
There is growing  evidence  that the labor market in recession  does  not 
undergo  a decline  in matching  efficiency.  Rather, a recession  is a time 
when  the matching  process  is called on to operate at much higher than 
normal volumes.  In recessions,  some firms cut back employment  sharply 
while the majority continue  to hire workers. The volume  of matches each 
month  rises approximately  in proportion  to the number of unemployed 
job-seekers.  Although  the  numerical  volume  of new  matches  is only  a 
rough  proxy  for  the  underlying  concept  of  creation  of  organizational 
capital, the facts on matching  do seem  to provide  some  support  for the 
view  that the marginal product of time spent job seeking  does not fall in 
recessions. 
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gated  and  interact with  each  other.  However,  I am not persuaded  that 
his  new  model  provides  a real business  cycle  model  that is consistent 
with observation. 
The following  are the stylized  facts that, taken collectively,  suggest  to 
Hall that agglomeration  effects are important to the cycle. 
1.  Declines  in employment  during recessions  in the manufacturing  sec- 
tor are not made uniformly, but rather are concentrated in large reduc- 
tions in employment  in some  plants. 
2.  Job finding  rates remain high  during recessions. 
3.  Productivity  is higher  during booms  than when  output is low. 
4.  Inventories  fluctuate more than production. 
5.  Increases  in  productivity  in  one  industry  are  positively  correlated 
with increases  in aggregate  output. 
6.  "Exogenous" events  that stimulate the demand for output in an indus- 
try or stimulate labor supply by affecting labor demand in other indus- 
tries result in increases  in employment  and small decreases in wages. 
The model  proposed  in Hall's paper to explain these facts is that there 
are complementarities  associated  with  both production  and reorganiza- 
tion so that it pays  to concentrate  production  all at the same time, and it 
pays  to  concentrate  organizational  capital  accumulation  at  the  same 
time.  The economy  thus  fluctuates  between  periods  of high production 
and periods  of high reallocation.  In the model,  the optimal allocation of 
resources  depends  on  the  rate of interest.  Exogenous  events  induce  a 
shift either toward  or away from goods  production  and consequently  to 
a change  in the observed  level  of output.  In particular, a decrease in the 
real rate of  interest  will  shift  the  optimal  allocation  of resources  away 
from goods  production  and  toward  the accumulation  of organizational 
capital. The model  argues,  therefore,  a result that surely must come as a 
surprise to the Fed, that recessions  are caused  by low real rates of inter- 
est.  Hall does  not test this aspect  of his model  directly, instead,  he says 
that the appropriate real interest rate is not observable because  discount 
rates used  by individual  firms may vary for idiosyncratic reasons.  How- 
ever, a key element  in the Hall theory is that there is some  decentralized 
mechanism  that leads  to coordinated  shifts  toward the accumulation  of 
organizational  capital  or toward  production.  This mechanism  must  be 
the common,  observed  component  of company discount rates. Coordina- 
tion  cannot  take place  using  the  unobserved  idiosyncratic  component. 
Since either goods  production  or the accumulation of organizational capi- 
tal is  equally  productive,  there  is  no  welfare  loss  associated  with  re- Comment  49 
cessions.  People  are making  a voluntary  decision  to  shift  resources  in 
response  to a change  in the relative price of the two activities. 
I like the idea  of organizational  capital, and I think it is important in 
the determination  of economic  growth  and is a reason why  some  coun- 
tries  have  found  it  difficult  to  develop.  Organizational  capital  is  not 
easily transferable among  countries.  A large multinational  company  can 
set up a whole  new  factory in a developing  country, but it either has to 
spend  time  and  money  accumulating  organizational  capital in the new 
plant or it can import the managers  and many  of the workers  from the 
United  States to get the factory started. And that defeats  the purpose  of 
investing  in a low-wage  country. 
Another  example  of the importance  of organizational  capital closer to 
home  is the  Toyota production  method  has been  responsible  for major 
productivity  advances  in  the  assembly  of  automobiles  and  in  related 
assembly  operations  in  Japanese  industry.  U.S.  auto  companies  have 
been  trying  over  several  years  to change  their plants,  with  only  mixed 
success.  The Toyota method  requires the abandonment  of existing orga- 
nizational capital and the accumulation  of new  capital-a  costly change. 
I also sort of like agglomeration  effects. This is an interesting and poten- 
tially important  idea.  We observe  many  institutions  and  arrangements 
that indicate  the  importance  of  these  effects.  Most  companies  operate 
with  the  same  work  week  and  concentrate  in  large  cities  despite  the 
serious  congestion  costs that result from these  choices.  There have to be 
important economies  of agglomeration  that are offsetting the congestion. 
I also find it plausible  that there can be significant thick-market effects 
in the labor market.  One  parable here is the annual AEA meetings  and 
their associated  round  of job market interviews.  Clearly there are effi- 
ciency gains in gathering  everyone  together in the same place and at the 
same time. 
While I recognize  the importance  of organizational  capital and of ag- 
glomeration  effects,  it is not at all clear that these are playing a major role 
in the business  cycle.  The Diamond  coconut  economy  is widely  cited to 
support the assumption  of agglomeration  effects, but this model is often 
misinterpreted  as  a  model  of  production  externalities.  In  Diamond's 
model  people  climb trees  and  collect nuts,  and  these  are activities  that 
are independently  pursued  with  no technological  spillovers.  There is a 
trading externality  such  that each firm is more likely to produce  if other 
firms  are  producing  because  the  probability  of  making  a  trade  is  in- 
creased.  I  like  this  Diamond  model  a  lot  as  a  model  of  demand 
spillovers,  the  kind  of thing  that lies behind  the Keynesian  multiplier. 
The Caballero and  Lyons  (1989) empirical  estimates  in which  aggre- 
gate output  appears  in industry-level  production  functions  are interest- 50 - BAILY 
ing, and I am willing  to give them weight.  But not as much as Hall gives 
them.  It is not surprising  that including  aggregate  output  in an industry 
productivity  equation  does  well.  There have been common  productivity 
shocks,  such  as the  oil price shocks,  that will give  rise to the observed 
correlations. And of course there are the demand  spillovers that will pick 
up  the  common  component  of  the  cycle  in  aggregate  demand,  and, 
hence,  will also give  rise to the kind of results that Caballero and Lyons 
report, giving  short-run increasing  returns in production.  In this regard, 
I note  the paper by Bartelsman,  Caballero, and Lyons (1991) that shows 
that  at  cyclical  frequencies  "the  linkage  between  an  industry  and  its 
customers  is the overriding  factor in the transmission  of external effects." 
Further, what  about  the  observations  that go  against  agglomeration 
effects.  Why have so many manufacturing  plants moved  to the southern 
states? Why are corporate headquarters  moving  out of New  York City? 
Why has the big trend in retailing been  away from high volume  central 
city stores  such  as those  on 47th street and toward outlet malls that are 
being built miles into the country? The other trend in retailing is toward 
suburban luxury malls where  one bored assistant sells one pair of Argyle 
socks  for fifty dollars  to the only  customer  who  shows  up that day. As 
others have  noted,  if agglomeration  effects are really so important,  why 
don't we  see higher  productivity  in Bangladesh. 
Hall will respond,  of course,  that other things  are not equal and that 
agglomeration  effects  are only  one  reason  for productivity  differences, 
but  that  argument  is  a two-edged  sword.  We also  need  to  take other 
things  into  account  before  we  conclude  that  the  high  productivity  in 
Hall's favorite examples  are due to agglomeration.  One reason that New 
York City  has  high  productivity  is  that  it  has  high  levels  of  physical 
capital,  high  levels  of human  capital, and high  levels  of organizational 
capital. There are certainly agglomeration  effects intramarginally.  That is 
why  we invented  corporations.  That is why  we invented  New  York City 
and  Los Angeles  and  regions  such  as Silicon Valley or Route  128. The 
question  is whether  these  effects  are still operating  importantly  on the 
margin, whether  they are relevant to the cycle. 
The weak  link in much  of the new  model  building  is that it is hard to 
find the kind of major production  externalities that Hall talks about. Some- 
body  needs  to  visit  some  companies  and  see  if they  can bring one  of 
these  externalities  home  in a cage so we  can look at it. What is it that is 
raising productivity  when  all companies  expand  together? 
I also  have  a problem  with  the  idea  that recessions  are particularly 
good  times  for job finding.  At the time of the AEA meetings  there is a 
tremendous  increase  in  both  workers  looking  for jobs  and  employers 
looking  for workers.  Both the supply  of labor and the demand  for it are Comment 51 
increased  in a coordinated  fashion.  Recessions  do not look exactly like 
this. Labor force participation  decreases  and the number of discouraged 
workers increases. 
I  have  no  quarrel  with  the  Davis  and  Haltiwanger  (1990)  or  the 
Blanchard and Diamond  (1990) labor market evidence,  but Hall's analy- 
sis of labor demand  presented  in this paper is problematic.  The instru- 
ments  used  in  his  analysis  are neither  terribly exogenous  nor  terribly 
powerful.  The  impact  of  oil  price  shocks  on  productivity  is  open  to 
debate,  but certainly they have been cited as a major reason for the slow 
growth  in  productivity.  Economic  conditions  affect  presidential  elec- 
tions.  Changes  in military expenditure  are probably more nearly exoge- 
nous,  but not perfectly  so. For example,  there was a substantial military 
build up in the Kennedy  years associated  with  Kennedy's  commitment 
to getting  the country  moving  again. 
If Hall's econometric  results were impeccable these criticisms might be 
muted,  but  this is not  the  case.  The coefficients  seem  very fragile. The 
sign  on  the  labor  demand  elasticity  is  reversed  if the  direction  of  the 
regression  is reversed.  There is a very  wide  variation across industries 
that is not explained  in the paper. 
On  the  labor  supply  side,  I agree  that  the  short-run  labor  supply 
schedule  is  very  flat,  but  I disagree  with  Hall's  view  that  this  slope 
reflects a rational choice on the allocation of time among alternative uses 
so that the amount  of unemployment  is socially efficient. Somehow,  says 
Hall, there is a decentralized  process  by which  firms know  of the gains 
from  reorganization  and  they  then  bring  about  the  necessary  adjust- 
ment.  I do not understand  this process. 
On the issue  of inventories,  my copy  of Hall's paper arrived together 
with  Alan  Blinder's  piece  with  Louis  Maccini  (1991) on  inventory  re- 
search, and I was struck in reading the paper by the way in which macro 
research  seems  to  have  distorted  its  methodology.  The rational choice 
model has become  the paramount  criterion for analysis; observation and 
deduction  take  a back  seat.  Blinder and  Maccini  spend  much  of  their 
time  seeing  if  one  can  jump  through  enough  hoops  to  reconcile  the 
rational choice  model  with  observation.  They point  out that if you  ask 
business  people  how  they  determine  their inventories,  they  generally 
talk about the Ss model.  They note  that this model  can be tested  and it 
fits  the  observed  behavior  of  inventories  pretty  well.  At  that point,  it 
seems  to me,  the burden of proof should  be on the critics to explain why 
they  think using  the Ss model  is irrational. I would  rather see  research 
follow  Alan's  lead  in another  area and  ask businessmen  why  they  use 
the  Ss  rule.  Have  they  tried  anything  else?  Do  they  know  their  own 
short-run  marginal  cost  and,  if  so,  do  they  take  that  into  account  in 52 *  BAILY 
setting  inventories?  Putting any paradigm ahead of observation  and en- 
quiry is a distortion  of the  scientific  method.  Inventory  behavior  is in- 
deed  suggestive  that  marginal  cost  curves  are  pretty  flat  or  possibly 
downward  sloping.  If that were  not the case,  then the Ss rule of thumb 
would  probably have broken down.  But the cyclical pattern of inventory 
holding  may not be tightly related to production  technology. 
To conclude  I want  to ask  how  many  of Hall's  stylized  facts can be 
accommodated  within  a more conventional  model  of the cycle, one that 
is consistent  with  the way  that a typical business  will describe  a reces- 
sion, namely  as a period where  prices and wages  are not that different to 
what  they  were  at full employment  (and will be again when  there has 
been a recovery),  but the firms would  like to sell more output and cannot 
find customers. 
Start with  some  shock  to the  economy  that induces  a cyclical down- 
turn. I am not sure that the nature of the initial shock is all that impor- 
tant, and different  cycles  may have  very different initiating events,  but 
to be specific I will assume  a money  supply  shock.  The monetary  shock 
reduces  aggregate  demand,  and  at the level  of the individual  firm this 
fall in  aggregate  demand  is  felt  as  a  reduction  in  sales  at  prevailing 
prices-the  firm level  demand  schedule  has shifted in and the elasticity 
of demand,  to the extent that this is a well-defined  concept in an oligop- 
oly, has changed  sharply. What happens  now? It does not cut its price by 
much,  and some  of the reasons  for this are discussed  elsewhere  in this 
volume.  We do not know  which  reasons  are the most important, but the 
fact that there is an aggregate  general equilibrium model of the economy 
that has the property  that a proportional  fall in all wages  and prices will 
avoid any decline  in real output  does  not tell us whether  this individual 
firm's decision  is rational. 
Given  the  shift  in  its  demand  curve,  the  firm will  certainly  find  it 
rational to reduce employment  and its response  is not well modeled  as a 
movement  along a stable schedule  in which labor demand  depends  only 
on  the  real wage.  It is a shift in  such  a schedule.  What form does  the 
employment  response  take? The firm knows  that some  of its plants are 
borderline in terms of long-term  profitability. This means  that the fall in 
demand  has  driven  the  present  value  of these  marginal plants  to zero 
and  so  it permanently  closes  them.  In general,  firms will  concentrate 
production  in  the  plants  that  are most  profitable  and  some  firms will 
give  up  and  close  their whole  operations.  In this economy,  do  we  see 
employment  reductions  concentrated  in  plant  closings  or large reduc- 
tions  in  employment,  consistent  with  the  Haltiwanger-Davis  results? 
Absolutely. 
The firm then  makes  a decision  about which  workers to lay off. Some Comment  *  53 
of its workers  are weak  in terms of quality or suitability for the job they 
are in,  and  so  the  firm  lays  them  off  knowing  that  they  will  not  be 
rehired. Some workers  it would  like to rehire later, but keeping  them on 
is too  expensive.  Like NFL teams,  it puts  some  workers  on  temporary 
layoff and hopes  that they are not claimed by another team. Some work- 
ers are essential  to  production  and  the  firm keeps  them.  They  do  not 
have enough  to do and so (to mix my metaphors),  they are given pit stop 
tasks such as maintenance  tasks or accumulation  of organizational  capi- 
tal while  the  caution  flag is in effect.  Are hiring rates high  during  this 
recession?  Absolutely.  Many of the laid off workers are rehired quickly. 
Are firms reorganizing  and shifting workers around? Absolutely. 
Are layoffs  privately  efficient  in the  sense  that the marginal value  of 
time equals  the  shadow  wage?  I am not  sure of the answer  to that.  In 
terms of social efficiency,  I am persuaded  that recessions  are inefficient. 
Better coordination  of economic  decisions  would  increase aggregate em- 
ployment,  output,  and  welfare.  And  the  Diamond  model  is  a useful 
parable in understanding  what  is going  on.  It describes  well  the ripple 
effect of a recession.  The expectation  of falling output  and employment 
generates  further declines  in output  and employment,  and the economy 
can move  to a temporary equilibrium with low production  and sales. 
In this economy,  is productivity  lower in recessions?  I believe  Hall of a 
couple  of years  ago: there  are short-run  increasing  returns and  market 
power,  so that firms adjust their production  by moving  around a short- 
run U-shaped  cost curve. 
This more conventional  view  of the cycle seems  to be broadly consis- 
tent with the facts of the cycle, but this consistency  has been achieved by 
departures from the simple textbook framework. Modeling  the cycle as if 
it were made  up of identical firms and workers is not adequate.  Reorga- 
nization  may be an important  part of the response  of the economy  to a 
fall in demand  and trading externalities  are important in understanding 
how  a small initial shock may lead to a widespread  downturn.  Perhaps 
production  externalities  are important also. We know they are important 
for technology  development  and long-term  growth,  and I have no basis 
for  ruling  them  out  for  the  cycle.  But  I do  not  think  they  eliminate 
aggregate  demand  as  perhaps  the  most  important  element  in  cyclical 
dynamics.  In recessions,  firms would  like to produce and sell more even 
with no changes  in prices. They are not deciding  to produce less because 
reorganization  is so profitable. 
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LAWRENCE  H. SUMMERS 
The  World  Bank  and  Harvard  University 
The impressive  thing  about this paper is its audacity. It presents  impor- 
tant ideas  and notions  that, if valid,  would  change  the way  economists 
think about the macroeconomy.  Creating visions  is much more difficult 
than refining them,  but ultimately  that is what all of us try to do. So one 
can admire the attempt  and appreciate  the strategy without  necessarily 
regarding this paper as the final word.  And that I am afraid is my view. 
There is an old discussion  joke to describe  my reaction to this paper: 
how  it contains  much  that is new  and  much  that is true, but,  unfortu- 
nately,  what  is  new  is  not  true  and  what  is  true  is  not  new.  Then  I 
realized  that I did  not  think  there was  very much  that was  true in this 
paper, so that the joke does  not apply. 
I am going  to discuss  three  things:  first, the strategy; second  the ap- 
proach to labor supply-the  "recessions  as reorganizations" notion; and 
third, the approach  to labor demand-the  "47th Street Photo business." 
Let me  talk first about  the  strategy. I welcome  Hall's use  of the term 
that Olivier and I first coined  a couple  of years ago,  "fragile equilibria." 
Since that term had  not gone  anywhere,  I had coined  two  new  expres- 
sions reflecting the same concept: "X economics  versus scissors econom- 
ics" and "acute angle  economics  versus  right angle economics." 
Let me  provide  a cookbook  approach  to fragile-equilibria economics. 
First, you  find a reason  for your model  to be reduced  to two schedules. 
Second,  you  find  a reason  for one  of the  schedules  to have  a perverse 
slope.  Third,  you  claim that in any  case  the  schedule  can also be rela- 
tively flat. At this point,  you are left with three options:  (1) you can take 
the modest  approach  that Hall has followed  today and argue that given 
two flat schedules,  a shift in either one will result in large displacements 
in quantity; (2) you can take a more aggressive  approach and claim that if 
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Let me  provide  a cookbook  approach  to fragile-equilibria economics. 
First, you  find a reason  for your model  to be reduced  to two schedules. 
Second,  you  find  a reason  for one  of the  schedules  to have  a perverse 
slope.  Third,  you  claim that in any  case  the  schedule  can also be rela- 
tively flat. At this point,  you are left with three options:  (1) you can take 
the modest  approach  that Hall has followed  today and argue that given 
two flat schedules,  a shift in either one will result in large displacements 
in quantity; (2) you can take a more aggressive  approach and claim that if Comment 55 
the schedules  move  a little more,  they will lie on top of each other, and 
therefore  there will be a continuum  of equilibria; or (3) you can become 
really ambitious  and  argue  that if the  schedules  wiggle  a bit more,  the 
result is multiple  equilibria. All of these  things,  which are often differen- 
tiated, are in fact very closely  related. 
There is another virtue to fragile-equilibrium economics:  one does  not 
need to have a very convincing  story about what causes the schedules  to 
shift, since small shocks will lead to large movements.  In this case, this is 
useful  since the paper does  not tell a compelling  story about the origin of 
the shocks. 
Let  me  discuss  the  shock  mechanism  as  I understand  it  from  the 
paper.  What  this  paper  argues  is  that firing a worker  imposes  a fixed 
cost on the firm. When the interest rate goes up-not  the actual interest 
rate  but  the  grand  shadow  price  interest  rate  that  is  conveniently 
unobservable-the  firm reduces  investment.  Since  firing people  is  an 
investment  the  firm  does  less  firing  and,  hence,  it is  left  with  more 
people.  With more people  around,  there are agglomeration  effects,  and 
the real wage  ends  up being  higher.  The shock  is that when  there is a 
higher  interest  rate,  there  will  be less  reorganization.  That means  that 
fewer  people  will be fired. Another  way  of stating this would  be to say 
that when  the interest  rate is high,  people  are willing  to take jobs more 
quickly, since,  after all, search is an investment,  and investing  in finding 
a better job is a poor idea. 
That is the mechanism  that is operating.  I have nothing  more to add, 
other than to describe the mechanism  and the source of shocks. 
Let me  now  proceed  to  the  paper's  two  schedules.  First, there  is  a 
supply  curve that reflects that the probability of finding a good  match- 
it\i.e.,  creating better capital for yourself-is  about the same in a reces- 
sion as in a boom. 
Let me  consider  the  evidence  on  this  point.  First, look  at Figure  1. 
Murphy and Topel (1987) show  that intersectoral and interregional mobil- 
ity are lower  during  recessions.  Job-to-job mobility, without  unemploy- 
ment,  occurs  less  during  recessions.  So,  in  fact,  the  economy  reorga- 
nizes  itself less  during recessions  than during booms. 
Second,  consider  the facts on the duration of unemployment  (which, 
by the  way,  were  first developed  by  an MIT assistant  professor  in the 
early  1970s).  The  incidence  of  long  duration  unemployment  does  in- 
crease significantly  in recessions.  Also,  expected  duration for the typical 
person  who  is unemployed,  as distinct from the typical person  flowing 
into unemployment,  increases  in recessions.  On this point see Figure 2. 
Third, as Figure 3 shows,  the quit rate is highly procyclical. One won- 
ders why,  if job searching  is just as productive  in bad times  as in good 56 *  SUMMERS 
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times.  In fact in good  times  people  decide  to go into the search activity 
and reorganize  themselves,  whereas  in bad times,  they do not. 
Fourth,  in  good  times  the  rate of labor force entry  goes  up.  In bad 
times the rate of labor force withdrawal  goes up. That is exactly what one 
would  expect if in fact the basic activity of reorganizing  yourself is much 
less productive  in bad times than it is in good  times. 
Fifth,  the  evidence  suggests  that,  at least  in  some  areas,  when  the 
unemployment  rate is high,  reservation wages  are lower and that job-to- 
job wage  growth  is lower for those  who  find their jobs during recessions 
rather than during booms. 
Sixth, if one  looks  at the aggregate  level,  one finds,  as Dickens  (1982) 
did,  that productivity  growth  is slower  over the long  term after a deep 
recession,  and  not  the  other  way  around.  This  runs  contrary  to  the 
notion  that recessions  are times when  good  capital is created. 
Finally, when  wars  start,  economies  reorganize  themselves  very  im- 
pressively,  quickly, and  effectively,  without  substantial  unemployment. 
When wars end,  a similar reorganization  takes place with a great deal of 
unemployment.  This suggests  that it is aggregate  demand  that explains 
the difference  and that the change  in unemployment  has nothing  to do 
with  the  amount  of  reorganization  that  is  taking  place.  Even  leaving 
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aside  the strong  statement  that wages  are rigid because  there is reorga- 
nization,  the  bold  statement  that  more  effective  reorganization  takes 
place  during  recessions  rather  than  in  booms  strikes  me  as  quite 
unlikely. 
What of the labor demand  side? Here, there is no question  that there is 
a major issue  in  explaining  procyclical  productivity  and  in  explaining 
procyclical real wages.  Hall's work has done much in defining  this issue. 
When I was  originally asked to discuss  this paper, I was told that this 
was going  to be the moment  when  we were going to see the real empiri- 
cal evidence  behind  the "47th Street Photo" business.  Hall was going  to 
present  this.  So I looked  eagerly  for labor demand  elasticities  that take 
account of agglomeration  economies,  since that seemed  like a good place 
to  start.  The  first thing  I did  was  average  the  numbers  in  the  Cobb- 
Douglas  column  and  average  the  elasticities  in  Hall's  column.  To my 
surprise,  I discovered  that in fact the average was lower in Hall's column 
than  it was  in  the  Cobb-Douglas  column.  Then  I was  reminded  that 
averaging  in  the  negative  is  not  quite  legitimate.  So I went  back and 
reread the  paper,  and  it said  "In every  industry  my view  is supported 
except for two." Then I counted  how  many there were and the total was 
three.  The evidence  in toto at the end  of all this strikes me as substan- 
tially less  than compelling. 
I was  going  to make some  remarks, the drift of which  is that none  of 
the  instruments  struck  me  as  likely  to be  particularly compelling  in  a 
study like this,  and if all of the "47th Street Photo" business  buys you is 
no more than saying  that the elasticity  of substitution  is 1.3 rather than 
1.0, it seems  somewhat  anticlimactic to me. 
What about the inventories  evidence?  My reaction to this, which could 
well  be  wrong,  is  that  almost  all of  the  work  on  manufactured  goods 
inventories  does  not  prove  much  of  anything,  if one  thinks  correctly 
about  the economics  of the  problem.  For instance,  let us  take automo- 
biles. We have General Motors, a set of auto dealers, and customers.  The 
problem is to ship the goods  from the manufacturers to the customers as 
inexpensively  as possible.  Between  General Motors and the dealerships, 
the problem of storing the goods  will presumably be worked out, assum- 
ing there are long-term  contracts and so forth, in a cost minimizing  way. 
And  surely if there is any place in the economy  where  there are implicit 
long-term  contracts,  it is in this chain.  If, for example,  stores are always 
full,  and  there  is  a  total  inventory  that  must  be  kept,  one  will  then 
observe  that the elasticity of inventory  at the manufacturing level will be 
much greater than if the economy  went  from a low point to a high point. 
And  that is precisely  the kind  of observation  that produces  the conclu- 
sion that there is a procyclical behavior  of inventories. Discussion 59 
So it seems  to me that the basic research strategy for studying  invento- 
ries in a disaggregated  way  is basically  misguided  once  one  recognizes 
that there are long-term  contracts and long-term relationships  that reach 
for cost minimizing  solutions  with those who are involved  in the distribu- 
tion channel. 
Nonetheless,  there  is a real and  central question  for someone  in this 
room to resolve  conclusively  during the next several years, in providing 
a convincing  explanation  for why  real wages  and  productivity  are so 
procyclical. 
As  Hall acknowledges,  it is difficult to name  a complementarity  that 
supports  this,  and  one  hesitates  to rely on something  so unlikely.  So it 
would  be  a great  triumph  if somebody  found  two  of them  and  caged 
them.  This would  be terrific micro evidence  for this notion.  If it takes us 
several  years  to think  of two  of them  to cage,  one  has  to wonder  how 
plausible  this is as an overall notion. 
I was  surprised  that there was no allusion in these debates to a notion 
that  strikes  me  as  equally  plausible  or equally  implausible  as  comple- 
mentarities  with  supergames  we  heard about this morning.  This is the 
notion  that recessions  are the times during which  liquidity problems are 
resolved,  that capital is a factor of production,  and that low capital costs 
translate  into  lower  prices  and,  therefore,  higher  real wages,  and  that 
booms  are  times  when  the  relevant  real  interest  rate  is  low.  This  is 
something  that shows  up in prices and causes  real wages  to be higher. 
That notion  has a set of problems  that are neither more nor less plausible 
than the notions  being  put forth here. 
At  the  end  of  the  day,  sabermetricians,  who  are to Tommy Lasorda 
what  econometricians  are to Nick Brady, have  noted  a regularity that I 
fear applies  to Hall's  effort here: that is that the  people  who  score the 
most home  runs also have the most strikeouts. 
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affect the economy,  but it does  not shift the production function.  Thus, it 
is  a valid  instrument.  The  same  is  true  of  military  purchases.  As  for 
inventories,  the strong,  positive  correlation of aggregate  output  and ag- 
gregate  inventories  is robust and flies in the face of sharply rising mar- 
ginal  costs.  Finally, Hall  agreed  that  it was  surprising  to  him  that his 
estimates  of  the  elasticity  of  capital-labor  substitution  was  so  close  to 
Cobb-Douglas.  He  argued,  though,  that  the  Cobb-Douglas  elasticity 
was not something  widely  agreed  to by the profession  and is an impor- 
tant result in itself. 
Olivier  Blanchard  objected  to  Hall's  interpretation  of  his  work  with 
Peter Diamond.  They find  that the matching  function  exhibits constant 
returns to scale,  which  implies  that the efficiency  of matching  in reces- 
sions  is low.  Also,  while  the  probability  of leaving  unemployment  for 
employment  does  not go down  much in recessions,  many people  move 
from  employment  into  out  of  the  labor force.  Thus,  overall,  duration 
increases.  Hall responded  that the  relationship  in question  is between 
the  volume  of  people  employed  and  the  stock  of  people  looking  for 
work.  While using  unemployment  as a measure  of time is problematic, 
the question  is whether  the relationship  is linear, and the above does not 
address  that issue. 
Robert  Barsky  submitted  that  Hall's  model  recasts  a  sectoral  shift 
theory  of aggregate  movements  with  temporal agglomeration  as a new 
twist.  Thus,  all of the evidence  against that theory such as Abraham and 
Katz could  be brought  to bear against  the paper. He also asked why, in 
light  of  the  fact that few  vacancies  and  quits  occur during  recessions, 
only  firms  initiate  reorganizations.  Hall  responded  that  the  issue  is a 
contractual  relation  of  who  is  given  the  responsibility  of  making  the 
decision  to initiate  reorganization,  and his paper with  Lazear speaks  to 
that  issue.  In  good  times  labor  chooses;  in  bad  times  management 
chooses.  The efficient  outcome  still arises. 
Julio Rotemberg questioned  whether  grouping industries  together and 
imposing  the  same  elasticity  of  labor demand  within  each  group  was 
legitimate.  He also agreed with Hall's use of the price of oil as an instru- 
ment  for  productivity  shocks.  He  noted  that  its  legitimacy  rested  on 
whether  it shifted  the marginal product  of labor schedule.  It can under 
standard  production  functions,  but its  effect is probably small.  Martin 
Baily thought  that it would  affect the rate of technological  change  for a 
value  added  production  function.  Hall  stated  that  when  using  value 
added  there is an assumption  of perfect complementarity  but that devia- 
tions are second-order. 
Robert Gordon  stated that he disagreed  with the strategy of modeling Discussion  *  61 
movements  of labor as movements  along  a stable labor demand  curve 
and instead  represent  movements  off of the curve.  He also offered that 
the concept  of the breakdown  of organizational  capital represents  mis- 
measurement  of labor input,  capital input and output.  These three types 
of mismeasurement  can explain  the procyclicality of productivity. 